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A B S T R A C T
We measure systemic risk via the interconnections between the risks facing both ﬁnancial and real economy
ﬁrms. SIFIs are ranked by building on the Google PageRank algorithm for ﬁnding closest connections. For a
panel of over 500 US ﬁrms over 2003–2011 we ﬁnd evidence that intervention programs (such as TARP) act
as circuit breakers in crisis propagation. The curve formed by the plot of ﬁrm average systemic risk against its
variability clearly separates ﬁnancial ﬁrms into three groups: (i) the consistently systemically risky (ii) those
displaying the potential to become risky and (iii) those of little concern for macro-prudential regulators.
1. Introduction
The interconnections between the ﬁnancial sector and the real econ-
omy mean that systemic risk can signiﬁcantly aﬀect employment and
output, as strikingly illustrated by the Great Depression of the 1930s,
and the weak recovery of the US economy following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers and the rescue of AIG in September 2008. Surpris-
ingly, very few empirical models of systemic risk explore the inter-
actions between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The empirical lit-
erature focuses on systemic risk within the ﬁnancial sector itself, and
in particular within the banking sector, sometimes with controls for
macroeconomic or industry environment, as in Kapadia et al. (2012)
and Schwaab et al. (2011), and sometimes with reference to sovereign
debt, as in Kalbaskaa and Gatkowskib (2012). A survey of the extant
empirical approaches is provided in Bisias et al. (2012).
We provide a framework for a systemic risk index based on the inter-
connectedness of ﬁrms from all sectors of the economy. We ﬁll the gap
in the empirical literature by explicitly recognizing the role of the real
economy in initiating, amplifying and dampening systemic risk in the
ﬁnancial sector. Although theoretical frameworks such as Acemoglu et
al. (2015) place the source shocks for systemic risk with the investments
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of banks in real economy ﬁrms the empirical literature does not reﬂect
this. Connectedness is fundamental to systemic risk as it lies at the heart
of the transmission of shocks around the economy, and is implicit in
many of the alternative deﬁnitions of systemic risk, such as the role of
common shocks, ﬁrm characteristics, networks, and the impediment to
the functioning of the ﬁnancial markets; see for example Allen et al.
(2012), Huang et al. (2012), Drehmann and Tarashev (2011), Billio et
al. (2012), Gai and Kapadia (2010), and Tarashev et al. (2010).
Measuring interconnectedness is empirically challenging in these
relatively large systems. Recent advances by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014)
and Langﬁeld et al. (2013) provide options for measuring both the
degree and the direction of the connections in large systems. Our
approach relies ﬁrstly on understanding systemic risk as interconnec-
tions in a system of time varying risk shocks, and secondly on exploit-
ing the technology of interconnectedness algorithms, such as typiﬁed
by Google search engines. In this way we produce not only an over-
all dynamic index of systemic risk, denoted the general systemic (GS)
index, but also a means of obtaining an up-to-date ranking, known as
the systemic risk (SR) ranking.
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Our ranking of individual ﬁrms in the economy captures both the
cross-sectional and time dimensions of systemic risk; see also Borio
(2003) and 2011. In the taxonomy of Bisias et al. (2012) this relates
to cross-sectional measures examining co-dependence; including the
expected capital loss or capital shortfall approach of Acharya et al.
(2010), Moore and Zhou (2012), and Brownlees and Engle (2017). It
also directly connects with the CoVar analysis of Adrian and Brun-
nemeier (2016), with an additional term relating correlation and
volatility; see Archarya et al. (2012) and Benoit et al. (2013) who derive
these measures in a common framework. van de Leur et al. (2017)
recently compared our ranking system with that of simple pairwise
correlations and conﬁrmed that there is an extra degree of informa-
tion available in our approach over methods such as SRISK, CoVAR
and Marginal Expected Shortfall (see Acharya et al. (2010), Adrian and
Brunnemeier (2016), Brownlees and Engle (2017)).
We examine the connections between shocks in risks over 500 US
companies drawn from the S&P500 index for the period 2003–2011.
The shocks to each company are computed from daily realized volatil-
ities which are calculated from high frequency market trading data.
Our focus on volatility as the source of risk shocks and the use of high
frequency data is consistent with the approach of Diebold and Yilmaz
(2014) who consider a system of 13 US ﬁnancial institutions with daily
realized volatilities; see also Huang et al. (2009). As Diebold and Yilmaz
(2014) emphasize, realized volatility measures have the advantages of
representing changes in market fear, and provide an indicator which
increases with crisis conditions.1
The important advantages of using market data are their timeliness
and extensive coverage of a wide variety of ﬁrms in the economy. They
particularly facilitate frequent updating of our proposed GS index for
the ﬁnancial sector and the SR ranking for each ﬁrm increasing our
ability to monitor risk in the ﬁnancial sector. Alternative approaches
include CDS data as in Giglio (2011), Markose et al. (2012), Nijskens
and Wagner (2011), although scope is more limited and liquidity can
be problematic; CPSS and IOSCO (2013). Interbank lending exposure
data such as used in Langﬁeld et al. (2013) and interbank money mar-
ket trading as in Giratis et al. (2016) are diﬃcult to obtain and do not
venture beyond the banking system itself. Other information such as
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc metrics calculated by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (2011, 2013) to identify global systemically important
banks are updated infrequently based on annual reports. Table 5 in
Bisias et al. (2012) overviews the data inputs for 31 diﬀerent systemic
risk measures, emphasizing the wide range of macro and ﬁnancial mar-
ket data in use, and the diﬃculties of accessing commercially sensitive
and private information.
Our empirical investigation highlights three main results. First, the
index of systemic risk GS shows a discernible increase in the years
leading up to September 2008. The index peaks in the lead-up to the
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and remains high in the following week
with the accompanying uncertainty about potential rescue of other
major banks and AIG. The index of systemic risk drops abruptly after
the AIG rescue and the announcement and ratiﬁcation of the TARP pro-
gram. It increases again in April 2010 signaling the spillover eﬀects of
the European sovereign debt crisis.
Second, we compare our GS index with the index of Brownlees and
Engle (2017), which is based on potential capital shortfall. Both mea-
sures indicated growing systemic risk in the lead up to September 2008.
However, following the policy intervention of TARP interconnected-
1 Earlier versions of our measure also contained three ﬁrm characteristics: leverage,
liquidity and size, each which has been associated with increased probability of identi-
fying a systemically risky ﬁrm; see Moore and Zhou (2012), and Brownlees and Engle
(2017) However, we found that these had no meaningful eﬀect on the rankings of ﬁrms
using this approach, and served only to add complexity in determining the weights each
characteristic should take.
ness risk falls, but systemic risk measured by capital shortfall does not,
meaning that policies of this nature can act as a circuit breaker in agi-
tating the crisis eﬀects via the real economy; see also evidence in King
(2011).
Third, a plot of the average systemic risk against its variability (for
each ﬁrm) eﬀectively separates three groups of ﬁnancial ﬁrms and high-
lights two areas of considerable regulatory interest. The ﬁrst consists
of ﬁrms which are consistently ranked amongst the most risky in the
economy and rarely move outside of this range – including JP Mor-
gan, Wells Fargo, Bank of America and Lehman (before its demise).
The second category of interest is ﬁrms with an average systemic rank-
ing somewhere in the middle of our sample but with high variabil-
ity, including AIG, KeyCorp, and Regions Financial Corp in our sam-
ple. These are ﬁrms which on average do not seem to be a source
of concern, but which have the capacity to quickly become a prob-
lem. Financial ﬁrms are predominantly found in these two groups,
providing strong evidence of the important role that macro pruden-
tial regulation may play in ensuring ﬁnancial and economic stability.
The ﬁnal group is ﬁrms which are consistently display little systemic
risk.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 explains our construction
of the SR ranking and the GS systemic index of the ﬁnancial sector as
a whole. Results are discussed in Section 3. We analyze the systemic
risk index for the ﬁnancial sector, and we compare it with the systemic
risk index based on capital shortfall of Brownlees and Engle (2017).
We then move to the ranking of individual ﬁrms in Section 4 and show
how the plot of the average versus standard deviation of our systemic
ranking for individual ﬁrms eﬀectively contributes to the discussion on
macro prudential regulation by identifying groups of ﬁrms of interest
to regulatory authorities. Section 6 concludes.
2. Methodology
We use an enhanced and adapted version of the eigenvector cen-
trality measures often used in network analysis, in particular PageR-
ank of Google.2 In a nutshell, we consider a network of ﬁnancial and
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm is endowed with a level of risk, reﬂect-
ing a potential for default. In line with previous literature (Acemoglu
et al., 2015, and references therein), we consider the shocks in these
risks. The connections between the ﬁrms are represented by the corre-
lations between the shocks. A ﬁrm is systemically important if its shock
is connected to many other ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial shocks, and if its
strongest linkages are with other companies that are also systemically
important.
Let N be the number of ﬁrms in the system; both ﬁnancial and
non ﬁnancial. We denote by Skt the systemic importance, or central-
ity, of ﬁrm k at time t. It depends on the systemic importance of its
peers:
Skt =
N∑
j=1
Sjtckjt . (1)
The time varying ckjt represents the transmission channel between com-
panies k and j at time t. The shocks in risk are computed by ﬁltering the
daily realized volatilities with ARFIMA models (as will be explained in
Section 3). The dynamics of the network are given by the strength of
the connections, which is captured by the correlations between shocks
in risk, denoted by 𝜌:
ckjt =
|𝜌kjt |∑
i∈jt |𝜌ijt | . (2)
2 As originally proposed in Brin and Page (1998).
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The shocks in risk are computed by ﬁltering the daily realized volatilites
with ARFIMA models (see Section 3 for more details).
The system of systemic importances can be written in matrix form
as 𝐒t = 𝐂t ⋅ 𝐒t . The matrix 𝐂t plays the role of the hyperlink matrix
in network design, where element ij is non-zero when there is a link
from node j to node i (where nodes in this case are individual ﬁrms).
Every column of the hyperlink matrix sums to one – as long as that ﬁrm
is connected to at least one other ﬁrm in the system. The solution is
the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of 𝐂t , which by
construction is one.3
One of the features of the build-up of the ﬁnancial crisis was the
increase in system-wide risks, which is captured by the average sys-
temic importance of the ﬁnancial sector. Indeed, as the strength of
the transmission channels increases, the network becomes more dense,
which translates into an increase of the systemic importances. Let n
be the number of ﬁnancial ﬁrms in our system and, without loss of
generality, let us assume that the ﬁnancial ﬁrms are order ﬁrst so that
ﬁrm k = 1,… , n is a ﬁnancial ﬁrm, and ﬁrm k = n + 1,… ,N is a non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrm. Then, the systemic risk index of the ﬁnancial sector,
denoted GSt , equals
GSt =
n∑
k=1
Skt
n . (3)
Finally, our ranking metric –the Systemic Risk (SR) ranking– is
SRt = rank(𝐒t). (4)
The construction of the system also allows us to construct subsector
indices; St is a matrix of systemic risks of both ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms. To illustrate the inﬂuence of the linkages between
the insurance sector and the real economy we construct a ﬁnancial
(sub–)sector index, denoted G̃St , which uses only the set of ﬁrms in
the ﬁnancial sector as the base for calculating the measures, i.e. the
systemic importance of ﬁrm k at time t as it is deﬁned in (1) is replaced
by S̃kt =
∑n
j=1 S̃jtckjt which only contains information about the connec-
tions between ﬁnancials.
The methodology we propose is straightforward and quick to calcu-
late with no need for optimizations, and it takes into account linkages
between the ﬁnancial sector and the real economy. This apparent sim-
plicity belies its demonstrated eﬀectiveness; see the analysis in van de
Leur et al. (2017).
2.1. Constructing conﬁdence bands
There exist a number of possible avenues to generate conﬁdence
bands, and a priori it is diﬃcult to discriminate between them. A ﬁrst
possibility is to bootstrap the risks shocks, and then use the boot-
strapped shocks to generate bootstrap realized volatilities. Once the
bootstrapped volatilities are generate we can repeat the whole proce-
dure of calculating the systemic risk index.
A second more tractable possibility consists of bootstrapping the
risks shock, and use the bootstrapped shocks to compute directly the
correlation coeﬃcients 𝜌kjt in Equation (2). Finally, a third possibility
is to skip the bootstrap, and to simulate at each draw d the correla-
tion coeﬃcients. For computational tractability we implement this third
avenue (noting that this system is relatively large with over 500 ﬁrms
involved).
To simulate the correlation coeﬃcients we exploit the approxi-
mate distribution of the Fisher transform of the correlation coeﬃcient.
Namely, let 𝜌kjt be the correlation coeﬃcient between the shocks of
3 The transmission matrix 𝐂t has zeros in the main diagonal, since a ﬁrm does not
transmit risk to itself.
asset k, and the shocks of asset j, estimated on the sample ending at
time t; and let
ẑkjt =
1
T log
(
1 + 𝜌kjt
1 − 𝜌kjt
)
be the Fisher transform of 𝜌kjt , which is approximately normal with
mean ẑkjt and standard error 1√T−3 . Then at each draw d we simulate
zdkjt ∼
(
ẑkjt , 1T−3
)
, and we apply the inverse Fisher transform to get
𝜌dkjt , namely4 :
𝜌dkjt =
exp
(
2zdkjt
)
− 1
exp
(
2zdkjt
)
+ 1
.
At each draw the algorithm works as follows: 𝜌dkjt is generated as
explained above, (ii) ckjt is computed as in (2), (iii) 𝐒dt is computed
as the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of 𝐂dt , and (iv)
the GSdt index and the ranking SRdt are computed using (3) and (4).
For each window this procedure is repeated 500 times, which gives a
distribution for the index of systemic importance, and the ranking.
A crucial issue when simulating correlation coeﬃcients is how to
treat those entries that are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. There
exists a large statistical literature (see Bickel and Levina, 2008; Fan et
al., 2013; Lam and Fan, 2009; among others) that has studied how to
estimate large covariance matrices, and the proposed estimators always
include some thresholding technique, which in our case is the testing
procedure. Some of these thresholding techniques have the so-called
“oracle property”, meaning that they consistently set to zero those cor-
relation coeﬃcients that are indeed zero. When a given thresholding
technique has the oracle property, then the correct approach is not to
simulate those entries that are cut out by the threshold. On the basis of
this, in our simulations we set 𝜌dkjt = 0 if 𝜌kjt is not statistically signiﬁ-
cant, and when 𝜌kjt ≠ 0, we simulate 𝜌dkjt as described above.
In summary, our conﬁdence bands measure uncertainty on the
strength of the connections, not uncertainty on which connections
really exist. Thus, the procedure we adopt is an approximation. The
issue of estimating large covariance matrices, and of constructing the
relative conﬁdence bands, is a focus of current attention in the statisti-
cal literature and it is outside the scope of this article.
3. The great ﬁnancial crisis, and beyond
Results are based on a newly compiled high frequency data set on
high frequency returns in the component stocks from the S&P500 index.
The dataset is composed of 502 time series, from January 2, 2003 to
December 30, 2011, for a total of 2262 trading days. For each ﬁrm in
the network, the shocks are calculated as the unexpected daily realized
volatilities, i.e. the diﬀerence between the estimated realized volatility
and its expectation. Our measures of the expected realized volatilities
are computed with ARFIMA models,5 while the realized volatilities
are estimated simply by summing the squared intraday returns over
the day.6 Our choice of realized volatilities rather than returns as the
items of interest represents the generally greater interest in volatility
transmission as a measure of shocks or uncertainty during periods of
stress.
4 For details on the Fisher transformation see Stuart and Ord (1994) volume 1.
5 This choice is motivated by Andersen et al. (2001, 2003) and Luciani and Veredas
(2011). They show that the ARFIMA(1, d,0) is an accurate representation of the long-
memory stylized fact of realized volatility.
6 The details on the intraday returns dataset and on how we compute the realized
volatilities are explained in the Appendix.
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Fig. 1. Systemic risk index for the US economy.
The time-varying analysis is computed with a rolling window of 400
days (roughly 1.5 years). The ﬁrst window starts in January 2003 and
ends in August 2004, meaning that the results cover from August 2004
onwards. Every time the window is rolled, the shocks and the correla-
tions between them are computed, and each correlation coeﬃcient is
tested against the null 𝜌jkt = 0. The test used exploits the approximate
distribution of the Fisher transform of the correlation coeﬃcients (see
for example Stuart and Ord, 1994). This procedure is repeated once a
week on the last day of the week (meaning on Friday unless the market
was closed).
Interpretation of systemic risk index movements has the advantage
of being relatively straightforward. An increase in the index occurs
when ﬁrms behave similarly, so an increase in G̃St indicates when ﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms are commonly experiencing increased unexpected volatility.
This situation is akin to what is represented in most systemic risk
indices, where focus is on the ﬁnancial sector alone. However, G̃St
also takes into account how indirect linkages with non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms
aﬀects these relationships. On the other hand, increases in GS indicate
situations when both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms are moving in
the same direction. That is, shocks in volatilities move in the same
way across a wide variety of sectors. This is potentially the most sys-
temically threatening outcome for an economy, as it is consistent with
increased uncertainty or risk taking across a wide range of industries.
Key to this insight is that it does not matter whether ﬁrms are mak-
ing proﬁts or losses as the system will be exposed to increased risk
when companies move in a similar direction due to a lack of diver-
siﬁcation. When indices for sectors and/or companies diverge, this
provides evidence of possible diversiﬁcation beneﬁts available in the
market.
The plot of the GSt index (3) is shown in blue in Fig. 1. The ﬁgure
clearly reaches its peak on the day deemed most risky in the sample –
which in this case is September 11, 2008. It shows a general increase
in systemic risk evident over the pre-crisis sample, and a rapid decline
thereafter.
The ﬁnancial sector systemic risk G̃St is shown in red in Fig. 1, and
is more complex than the overall index. Five sub-periods are clearly
evident. Period I up until early 2006 presents a time of plenty - there
is a general buoyancy in the markets and good proﬁts are common.
However, in 2006, in line with the pause (and subsequent decline) in
the quantity of housing market lending some banks begin to restrict
credit. The economy is still experiencing good growth, but borrowing
is a little more restricted - this period is evident in 2006–2007. In the
period from 2007 until the advent of the crisis is the period we denote
the credit risk transfer period. The banks have reduced their lending
for housing, and a number of ﬁnancial ﬁrms (such as the Bear-Stearns
hedge fund) begin to feel the pinch. There is a collapse in the prices
and issuance of Asset backed securities, evident in the ABX indices; see
Dungey et al. (2013).
The crisis is associated with a peak of tensions for the whole econ-
omy but less so for the ﬁnancial sector itself (due to the oﬄoad-
ing of the risky exposures via credit risk transfer). Ultimately the
bankruptcy of Lehman Bros followed a week of growing stress in the
ﬁnancial system which included the Federal takeover of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac and a period of intense speculation as to whether
regulatory intervention would occur to save Lehman. This is evident
in the rapid increase of the G̃St index at the peak of the crisis in
September 2008. Tensions remained very high in the period until
September 23, 2008, following the bailout of AIG (September 16); this
period has been pinpointed as the most risky in at least 25 years in
2011.
From September 23, 2008 our index shows that the systemic risk in
the ﬁnancial sector began to decline. This is Period IV in our analysis,
where the fall in systemic risk is consistent with adjustment of expecta-
tions concerning the ongoing eﬀects of the crisis. At this time Congress
was debating the extent of the proposed $US700 billion bailout fund-
ing ﬁrst mooted by US Treasury Secretary Paulson on September 19.
The index for systemic risk GS fell sharply with the rescue of AIG and
the announcement of TARP. However, the fall in the index focused
only on ﬁnancial ﬁrms, G̃St , took longer to decline, consistent with
the problems noted in the rest of the literature in the banking sec-
tor – as these programs did not address the capitalisation problems in
the banks. The period where both indices are declining is our Period
IV.
In Fig. 1 we compare the GS index with the monthly SRISK index of
Brownlees and Engle (2017). The index of Brownlees and Engle (2017)
measures risk as potential capital shortfall in the system, which is quite
diﬀerent from our measure of interconnectedness. However, the two
measures are highly complementary. One gives information about the
interconnected nature of the economy, and the other gives informa-
tion about the capacity of the economy to absorb a ﬁnancially trau-
matic shock. Immediately after September 2008 the drop in intercon-
nectedness represents the brake applied by policy interventions to the
downward spiral between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, whereas
the continued high level of SRISK and G̃St captures the continued prob-
lems with recapitalising the banks. When both GS and SRISK are ris-
ing the danger from a systemic event is high as it is likely to both
spread widely and be highly disruptive to the capitalisation of the
economy.
Given that we know that the ﬁnancial ﬁrms are behaving more sim-
ilarly (from G̃St) we infer that the diversity evident from GS occurs
because there has been a breaking of the link between ﬁnancial ﬁrms
and real economy ﬁrms. Although ﬁnancial ﬁrms may still be under
considerable stress, evident in the continued stress evident after the
Lehman Bros collapse in indices such as SRISK in 2017. We infer
that the diversity evident from GS occurs because there has been
a breaking of the link between ﬁnancial ﬁrms and real economy
ﬁrms.
A reduction in systemic risk due to the TARP announcement is con-
sistent with evidence of reduced perceptions of market risk and the
generosity of the program, compared with those implemented in Euro-
pean and British jurisdictions, see King (2011). In response to the res-
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Table 1
Classiﬁcation of ﬁnancial stocks.
Deposit Insurance
Bank of America Corporation ACE
BB&T Corporation AFLAC Inc
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation American International Group Inc
Citigroup Inc Assurant Inc
Comerica Incorporated The Allstate Corporation
Huntington Bancshares Incorporated The Chubb Corporation
JPMorgan Chase & Co Cincinnati Financial Corp
KeyCorp Genworth Financial Inc
M&T Bank Corporation Hartford Financial Services Group Inc
Peoples United Financial Inc Lincoln National Corp
PNC Financial Services Group Inc Marsh & McLennan Companies Inc
Regions Financial Corp MBIA Inc
Synovus Financial Corp MetLife Inc
SunTrust Banks Inc MGIC
State Street Corp Principal Financial Group Inc
US Bancorp Progressive Corp
Wells Fargo & Company Prudential Financial Inc
Zions Bancorp Torchmark Corp
Unum Corporation
XL Capital
cue packages, US banks actually outperformed the general market. King
(2011) interprets this as evidence for the general acceptance of stabil-
ity of the system, as both banks which did and did not receive assis-
tance had improved share market outcomes, although those who did
not receive assistance were more strongly rewarded.
The behavior of the ﬁnancial sector index and the overall index
is markedly diﬀerent after 2010, Period V. Here G̃St stabilises while
GS begins to rise again, reﬂecting that the ﬁnancial sector ﬁrms are
somewhat stable in their relationships with each other, while the dif-
ferences between ﬁnancial sector and real economy ﬁrms is reduc-
ing (there is increased correlation). Systemic risk begins to increase
again for the overall index from April 2010, consistent with increas-
ing concerns over emerging problems in European sovereign debt mar-
kets, and speciﬁcally Greece. While the ﬁrst signs of Greece’s problems
emerged in late 2009, it was in the ﬁrst quarter of 2010 that inter-
national ﬁnancial markets were aﬀected. The nadir of the GS index
occurs around 15th April, which is after the EU bailout package was
announced, but before the call for IMF assistance on April 23. The rise
in risk seems likely to be related to realization of the severe contagion
risks associated with potential escalation of the crisis and the estimated
larger combined exposure of the international banking sector to Greece,
Portugal and Spain (see “Still in a Spin”, The Economist, April 15,
2010).
To sum up, in assessing the policy interventions one can draw the
conclusion that if the aim was to halt the spread and ampliﬁcation of
the crisis occurring via the interconnectedness of the ﬁnancial sector
and real economy, then this should be deemed to have been successful.
4. Deposit-takers and insurers
The data set contains 20 insurance companies and 18 deposit–taking
institutions (all of whom were recipients of funding from TARP);
see Table 1 for the classiﬁcation. We do not concentrate on the
separate indices for other ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the data set due to
the diversity of their interests, for example, dealer/brokers, real
estate investment, health care investment, and funds management
advice.
Fig. 2 provides a scatterplot of the average of the SR ranking for
each of the 502 ﬁrms in the system by year, for an individual ﬁrm
(horizontal axis) against the standard deviation of its ranking (vertical
axis). The open circles represent the non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, blue xs are
banks, red squares are insurance ﬁrms, and black asterisks are other
ﬁnancials.
There are two areas of the curve described by the scatterplot that are
likely to be of interest to regulators. The ﬁrst is the area of ﬁrms at the
left end of the curve. These ﬁrms are consistently ranked amongst the
most systemic – and they do not often fall out of this category. Across
the years spanned by our sample closest to the origin we generally ﬁnd
four banks: JP Morgan, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, and Lehman
Brothers. Of these, Lehman did not survive the crisis events of 2008.
The three remaining banks are some of the largest by customer base and
capitalisation in the US. They are also identiﬁed as Global SIBs by the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011, 2013) rankings, and
as systemically important by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). Thus there is strong agreement amongst diﬀerent approaches
that these banks pose substantial systemic risk to the economy.
The second area of potential macroprudential policy concern cor-
responds to ﬁrms which have ranking somewhere near the middle of
our sample, but with high standard deviation. That is, they are near the
apex of the curve described by the scatterplot. These ﬁrms generally
present as not particularly systemically important but their situation
may change rapidly. They include ﬁrms such as the insurers AIG, and
banks like Keycorp, Synovus and the ﬁnancial conglomerate Regions
Financial Corp. Firms at the far right hand end of the plots are unlikely
to be of interest to policy makers, they are consistently not very sys-
temic.
In 2005, 2006 there were around 10 ﬁnancial institutions in the
far left corner of the scatter plots, including those already mentioned
above. This built dramatically in 2007. Essentially, there were a new
set of entrants in this area of the curve, consisting of institutions includ-
ing BB&T (BBT), Franklin Resources (BEN), Comerica (CMA), Pruden-
tial Financial Group (PFG), Metlife (MET), M&T Bank (MTB), and Syn-
ovus (SNV). The analysis clearly identiﬁes that systemic risk in ﬁnancial
ﬁrms was growing in 2007. In 2008 there also is an elevated number of
ﬁnancial ﬁrms showing systemic risk. From 2009 onwards the situation
changes with a dramatic drop in the number of ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the far
left corner, and even fewer in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Consistent
appearances amongst the most systemic ﬁrms are again made by JP
Morgan, Wells Fargo and Bank of America. Loews and Prudential make
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Fig. 2. Mean versus standard deviation rankings by year.
an appearance in this category in the last two years of our sample.7
In all, these plots provide an easily digested visualisation of the sys-
temically important ﬁnancial institutions drawing from the daily SR
ranking computed from a system of interconnected risks amongst the
real and ﬁnancial sectors in the US. They summarizes the analysis of
7 Loews Corporation owns 90% of CNA, a commercial and casualty insurance com-
pany that is among the largest in the US, and about 63% of the total revenues of Loews
in 2011, the most important business line of the Corporation.
the changing nature of the links between companies and their subse-
quent movement in ranking of systemically important ﬁrms. The results
strongly suggest that this index indicated the emergence of both increas-
ing systemic risk in the ﬁnancial sector as a whole and identiﬁed the
emergence of greater systemic importance of individual ﬁnancial ﬁrms
in advance of the crisis events of 2008. Consequently, a measure of sys-
temic risk via interconnectedness between the ﬁnancial and real econ-
omy sectors as proposed in this paper may prove to be a useful tool for
the arsenal of macro prudential regulation.
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4.1. Insurers
The spread of regulatory attention to insurers since the rescue of
AIG prompted protests from the industry, and reassurance from policy
makers that insurers are recognized as less systemically risky than the
banking sector. The results provide empirical evidence using a scatter
plot (Fig. 2) of the average ranking of individual ﬁrms on the horizon-
tal axis against the standard deviation of that ranking on the vertical
axis. The 𝐱 show the location of the deposit-taking ﬁrms, while squares
show the insurers. Other ﬁnancial sector ﬁrms are given by asterisks. It
is immediately apparent that not only there are a substantial number of
systemically important ﬁnancial ﬁrms near the origin, but that there is
a distinct pattern in the location of banks and insurers that contributes
immediately to the policy debate. Of the most systemically important
ﬁnancial ﬁrms, the deposit taking and other ﬁnancial ﬁrms are nearest
the origin – that is they are consistently the most systemic. This group
includes JPMorgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, Bank of America, Wells
Fargo, Goldman Sachs, US Bancorp, Morgan Stanley, and PNC Finan-
cial Services Group.8 Insurers comprise a broad second group, con-
centrated – with Principal Financial, Loews, MetLife, Prudential, and
Allstate clustering together. This is entirely consistent with the existing
rhetoric from both the discussion and empirical evidence of the aca-
demic literature, regulators and the industry that insurance is not as
systemically important as banking.
A diﬀerent pattern emerges near the apex of each plot. Firms in these
positions can move quite considerably. If we undertake a scatterplot
for the entire sample period we ﬁnd that the ﬁrms nearest the apex
(and their co-ordinates) are AIG (238,201), Synovus (211,202), Unum
(235,178), that is two insurers – AIG and Unum – and a community
bank.
The case of Unum is cloudier than most, as it is considerably com-
plicated by a signiﬁcant settlement package in May 2008 around alle-
gations of artiﬁcially inﬂating stock prices during the early part of the
decade. This couples with a number of signiﬁcant settlements regarding
bad faith practices in insurance payouts and company rebranding from
UnumProvidential to Unum in 2007 to make this a particularly diﬃcult
ﬁrm to characterize.
The path of Synovus reﬂects their rapid decline from a record proﬁt
year in 2006, accompanied by ambitious geographical expansion plans
to a group with a goodwill impairment of $480million in 2008, badly
aﬀected by the decline in the housing market in its regional home-
land in the South Eastern States and making ﬁnancial losses every
year from 2008 to 2011 (Synovus Annual Reports, 2006–2012). Syn-
ovus had suﬃciently impaired capital that it undertook a $968 million
TARP contract with the US Treasury, and had a substantially longer
period until repayment in July 2013 than most institutions.9 As part of
its return to proﬁtability in 2012 it has undergone a dramatic restruc-
ture, consolidating its previous 30 banking charters into one organiza-
tion, but attempting to carefully retain its image as a community based
bank.
The AIG case has been subject to detailed analysis – Harrington
(2009) provides an excellent review – particularly detailing the com-
plex nature of this conglomerate of over 70 companies in 2006, their
high exposure to the CDS market, mortgages, securities lending, and
the extent to which their fate was interwoven with that of the banking
sector. Harrington (2009) makes a convincing case that the rescue of
this company was critically aﬀected by considerations of their counter-
8 American Express Company, The Goldman Sachs Group Inc, Lehman Brothers, and
Morgan Stanley are (or were) non deposit taking ﬁnancial institutions, hence its classiﬁ-
cation on the asterisk group.
9 Extensions of TARP liabilities beyond December 2013 attract a higher rate of return
to the Treasury.
Table 2
Position of AIG in scatterplot by year.
Year Average rank Standard deviation
2005 137 68
2006 285 52
2007 58 48
2008 108 138
2009 473 27
2010 496 1
2011 494 5
party relationships. Many banking sector ﬁrms would have been seri-
ously aﬀected by failure of AIG – and this extended well beyond simple
US counter-parties, the EU banking system was highly vulnerable to any
potential collapse in AIG.
The details of how AIG has fared in a year by year analysis is pro-
vided in Table 2. In 2005, 2006 it is apparent that it was ranked rel-
atively towards the right hand end of the scatter, although still with
reasonably high standard deviation, and that in 2007 it dramatically
increased in systemic riskiness to be ranked 48th that year - in 2008
this receded to an average of 108th ranking but in 2009 ricocheted
back to a rank of over 400, reﬂecting the eﬀects of the calmer market
concerns about AIG after the rescue plan was enacted.
A number of other institutions, such as Zions and Marsh and McLen-
nan, have an average ranking around the middle of the horizontal axis
but with lower standard deviation – although this must be placed in
context that the standard deviation remains considerably above that
of the majority of real sector ﬁrms. Other institutions which ﬂuctu-
ate considerably across the time span are Freddie Mac, which, along
with Fannie Mae, was taken into conservatorship on September 6, 2008
before returning to government sponsored enterprise status - Fannie
Mae on the other hand may be found to the right of the distribution
at coordinates. The ﬁrms of no regulatory interest, that is those in the
extreme right of the scatterplot, are typically not from the ﬁnancial sec-
tor, although one deposit taking institution, the People’s United Finan-
cial is in the consistently least systematically important group.
The results support the industry and regulatory claims that insur-
ance companies are less systemically important than the banking sector.
However, as an industry group, the insurance companies are clustered
immediately behind the banking sector in the systemic threat they pose
to the economy. This comes about due to the strong interlinkages both
within the ﬁnancial sector, between banking and insurance, see also
Schwarcz and Schwarcz (2014), but also through their strong links to
the real economy – both through the insurance services they provide
and their ventures into non-traditional risk taking products.
If macro-prudential regulation is designed to limit the disruptions
to the real economy caused by withdrawal and contraction in credit
markets, then the growing presence of insurers in this market argues
strongly for their inclusion in a regulatory framework which recognises
the diﬀerential nature of their underlying customer base, whereby runs
on insurance policies are unlikely although catastrophic events chal-
lenge capital periodically. The challenge will be to avoid regulatory
arbitrage emerging in another sector of the economy to exploit the
highly proﬁtable business of the credit risk transfer services which are
highly valued by the non-ﬁnancial consumer and producer sectors of
the economy.
4.2. Robustness
Here we record the robustness of the results to the data pre-ﬁltering
method and the choice of window length. The top panels of Fig. 3 show
the robustness of the results to use of an ARMA(1,1) pre-ﬁlter for the
stock data in contrast with the ARFIMA results presented in the body
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Fig. 3. Robustness to ﬁltering and window length choices.
of the paper.10 The left hand panel is the overall index and the right
hand panel the ﬁnancial sector index. It is immediately evident that
the two lines (the black with ARFIMA pre-ﬁltering and the red with
ARMA pre-ﬁltering) are substantially the same. The lower panels of
Fig. 3 show the overall and ﬁnancial systemic risk indices produced
using moving windows of 250 days (red), 400 days (black) and 500
days (blue). It is apparent, particularly for the overall index that these
make little diﬀerence with the exception of the usual result of smaller
moving windows being associated with greater volatility and earlier
detection of change, whereas longer windows are associated with less
volatility and later detection of change. The earlier detection of change
10 An ARIMA pre-ﬁlter would imply non-stationary realized variance, and is hence
not considered.
and greater volatility of the smaller window is most apparent in the
ﬁnancial sector index, where it records a much earlier and larger drop in
systemic risk in 2005 than the drop recorded in the long window index
in 2006. Reassuringly, however, all three indices move simultaneously
sharply upwards in September 2008, representing their ability to detect
rapid dramatic changes in systemic risk.
5. Implications
The GS index, and the associated analysis of the relationship
between its mean and standard deviation over time, reveal two strong
empirical messages for policy makers. First, the relationships between
ﬁnancial sector and real economy ﬁrms are vitally important in under-
standing the role of policy interventions to protect the economy dur-
ing periods of crisis. Although interventions such as TARP have not
been noted as reducing systemic risk assessed via capital loss measures
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such as SRISK, they do make a considerable diﬀerence to the intercon-
nectedness between the ﬁnancial and real economy sectors. By sepa-
rating these two sectors the intervention acts to dampen the feedback
eﬀects between them. In this way the real economy is somewhat pro-
tected from lack of credit to continue operations, and subsequently pro-
tects the ﬁnancial sector from further loss due to bankruptcy and busi-
ness failures in the real economy. Interventions to reduce connectivity
clearly have a place in the policy makers arsenal if the goal is to mini-
mize the overall loss of economic activity during a ﬁnancial crisis. This
of course, does not mean that the redistributions involved will always
be considered fair by the agents in the economy.
Second, the analysis clearly identiﬁes that deposit-taking institu-
tions are routinely more systemically risky than other types of ﬁnancial
institutions. However, insurance companies are a readily identiﬁable
group of ﬁrms which are consistently highly ranked for systemic risk;
and are the most easily identiﬁed industry after banking. Thus our anal-
ysis supports the argument that insurance companies are a good candi-
date for systemic oversight, but they are also a less obvious issue than
deposit-taking/credit-creating institutions. It is likely that the blurring
of functions between traditional insurance products and other ﬁnan-
cial innovations carried out by insurance companies are contributing to
their systemic risk proﬁle. Insurance industry ﬁrms which wish to avoid
the development of further regulatory oversight would be well-advised
to clearly demonstrate their points of diﬀerence from credit-creation
style activities.
The lessons for investors are also clear. In times of crisis the ﬁnancial
sector ﬁrms are critical in whether shocks from one part of the economy
are transmitted to others. There are important moral hazard problems
in knowing whether the regulators will routinely intervene to dampen
the connectivity between sectors during periods of stress. If, on balance,
the regulators are expected to intervene in severe cases, then real econ-
omy ﬁrms will not bear the full brunt of the crisis, making it attractive
to have non-ﬁnancial stocks in a portfolio. The performance of ﬁnan-
cial sector stocks will depend on the form of intervention undertaken;
supporting the ﬁnancial sector may result in excess returns for capi-
tal invested in that sector, but actions such as forced merging and/or
resumption of ownership may result in excess loss. The origins of the
crisis determine the form of response of the policy makers. Thus while
it is good policy to have a number of strategies to implement reduced
connectivity between the real economy and the ﬁnancial sector during
periods of extreme stress, it will not be easy for investors to anticipate
the form that intervention may take, and hence to proﬁt from it. With-
out this uncertainty it would be diﬃcult for the policy actions to be
eﬀective as these expectations would be priced.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we produce an overall index of systemic risk for the
ﬁnancial sector, and a ranking for each of the ﬁrms in the dataset. To
this end, we examine the connections between shocks in risks over 500
US companies drawn from the S&P500 index for the period 2003–2011.
Our approach takes into account that ﬁrms are related by a system of
risks, which may be aﬀected by shocks that are transmitted through
both the ﬁnancial sector and the real economy. An adaption of the
Google PageRank algorithm is used to account for the interconnections
of ﬁrms in the economy, and allows a ranking of the most systemically
important.
Our overall index of systemic risk shows that policy interventions
such as the TARP and the rescue of AIG halted the decline in the ﬁnan-
cial sector relative to the real economy ﬁrms. Thus in assessing the
policy interventions one can draw the conclusion that if the aim was
to impede the spread and ampliﬁcation to the real economy, then this
should be deemed to have been successful. However, while these policy
interventions were eﬀective in reducing systemic risk as measured by
interconnections, they did not alter systemic risk measured by capital
shortfall, as shown in Brownlees and Engle (2017).
Our systemic risk ranking suggests the importance of two categories
of ﬁrms in assessing systemic risk. First, those which consistently rank
as the most systemic throughout the sample –including banks such as
Wells Fargo, Bank of America and JP Morgan. Second, those ﬁrms
which may on average rank in the middle of the system, but have the
capacity for rapid change, such as AIG and KeyCorp. Financial ﬁrms fea-
ture prominently in both of these groups. This reinforces the regulatory
emphasis placed on understanding and perhaps limiting the exposure
of the economy to these institutions.
There are a number of important extensions which could be coun-
tenanced to this work. The ﬁrst is widening the scope of the ﬁrms
included in the analysis. This includes incorporating ﬁrms which do
not trade in the S&P500 and those which are not even listed, perhaps
using criteria such as assets under management. It also includes exten-
sions beyond the US, to incorporate cross-border ﬁnancial institutions
and the issue of global SIFIs.11 The second is to relate the systemic
outcomes to ﬁrm characteristics, and indeed diﬀerent characteristics
for diﬀerent sectors, or sectors in diﬀerent jurisdictions. Additionally,
controls for macroeconomic conditions more generally may add further
information. Finally, adapting this approach to consider leading and
lagging correlations may enable us to examine mechanism for shock
transmission and directionality in the system, consistent with the pair-
wise Granger-causality approach in Billio et al. (2012) and Diebold and
Yilmaz (2014). Our methodology is ﬂexible enough to accommodate
these extensions.
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A. Data
A.1.
Intraday returns
The raw data consist of 5 min observations downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Tick History for all RIC codes included in the S&P500
provided by SIRCA for the period January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2011. The initial download contains 935 tickers.12 The dataset used in this
paper does not purport to be a full history of all stocks on the S&P500, but rather draws from the universe of S&P500 listed companies for the
period 2002–2011. After this process the sample contains 557 stocks. Programs in C+ are available on request to both replicate the data and make
alternative selections.
As our methodology is best applied to a balanced panel of stocks we ﬁrst truncate our sample to begin in January 2003, as there are considerable
numbers of stocks which did not have full data in the earlier years. We then have data of three types: stocks which are present throughout the
entire sample, stocks which leave part way through the sample, and stocks which enter partway through the sample. Additionally, we drop a small
number of stocks with insuﬃciently complete data. We then choose to force inclusion of three stocks which would not have made it through this
data cleaning process: these were Lehman Brothers (who were delisted in 2008 after becoming bankrupt), Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Following
their placement into conservatorship on September 6, 2008, the ordinary stocks of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were no longer traded on the
exchange. We use data from alternative markets, mainly OTC and NYSE Arca for the intervening periods between the cessation of the listed stocks
and the emergence of a steady stream of OTC Bulletin Board data from after their return to government status. At the ﬁnal stage there are 502 time
series for stocks in the database, from January 2, 2003 to December 30, 2011, for a total of 2262 trading days. The complete list may be found in
the web-appendix.
A.2.
Realized volatilities
Using the last trade in each 5 min period between 9:30am and 04:00pm each trading day we construct annualized daily realized volatilities as
the sum of squared intradaily returns, with overnight returns removed. These realized volatilities form the basic dataset, xjt . More precisely, let rjti
be the intraday trade return of ﬁrm j on day t at 5-min time i = 1,… ,N. The annualized realized volatility is
xjt = 100
√
252
√√√√ N∑
i=1
r2jti.
This is the simplest estimator of the integrated volatility from high frequency data, and is valid if prices follow a Brownian motion.
If prices have a jump component this will be incorporated into xjt ; see 2004. While the inclusion of jumps in a measure of integrated volatility
is a disadvantage for analyses that focuses on volatility, this is an advantage in our case. Jumps are a distinguishing feature of asset pricing
under stressful conditions and occur in response to information as shown in Dungey et al. (2009), Lahaye et al. (2011), Andersen et al. (2007).
Thus their inclusion is practically important in attempting to empirically model systemic risk. While the estimator is in principle contaminated by
microstructure noise, 5-min data is the commonly used benchmark trade-oﬀ between information and noise for liquid assets; see for example 2011
and 2007.
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